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Summary: Mcneil Testimony On U.S. "obsession With
Nicaragua," Noriega, Arms &amp; Drug Traffic
by Deborah Tyroler
Category/Department: General
Published: Friday, April 8, 1988
On April 4, Francis J. McNeil testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's
subcommittee on terrorism, narcotics and international operations, chaired by Sen. John Kerry.
McNeil, a 31-year Foreign Service officer, left the State Department in February 1987, due to
"clashes" with Asst. Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Elliott Abrams. At the time of his
resignation, McNeil held the position of Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence
and Research. Among other posts in his career, McNeil served as US Ambassador to Costa Rica, and
Deputy Asst. Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. McNeil's testimony on selected topics
is summarized below. "Obsession with Nicaragua" Leads U.S. to Subvert Anti-Drug & Support for
Democratization Policies In his testimony, McNeil argued that some US officials' "obsession with
Nicaragua" precluded "rational decisionmaking" regarding other US policy objectives, particularly
commitments to curb international drug trafficking and terrorism, and to support democratization
in Latin America. The case of Panamanian Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega According to McNeil,
by 1984 "it was fairly common knowledge" among US officials that Noriega was involved in the
drug trade. It was understood that "not a sparrow falls in Panama without Gen. Noriega getting a
feather from that sparrow. And consequently, he had to know what was going on, and he had to be
involved." The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the CIA possessed information on the
involvement in the drug by Panamanian military officers. However, at that time, "no information
[had been] disseminated linking Noriega to specific drug deals... "There was a particular focus
from [the US] embassy in Panama...and that was that Panama was slowing going to Hades in a
hand basket." US officials were concerned about Panama in that Noriega was gaining increasing
control, and corruption and drug trafficking were on the rise. After delivering a brief chronology
of Panamanian developments, beginning with Noriega's entry as commander- in-chief of the
Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) in 1983, McNeil pointed out that in mid-September 1985,
President Nicolas Ardito Barletta announced his intention to investigate the torture-murder of a
popular doctor, Hugo Spadafora. [The primary suspect in Spadafora's murder was a PDF-linked
death squad called F-8 Terrorista.] Shortly thereafter, Ardito Barletta was removed by the PDF.
According to McNeil, State Department and other US officials discussed a recommendation by
then-US Ambassador to Panama, Everett Briggs: US backing for deposed President Ardito Barletta,
or the same "we have now done for [deposed President Eric Arturo] Delvalle." The ambassador's
suggestion, said McNeil, was "overruled." McNeil added that he believed Elliott Abrams overruled
Briggs' recommendation. McNeil moves on to a series of incidents beginning with the publication
of articles by the New York Times in June 1986 which focused on Noriega's alleged involvement in
the drug trade, and links with US and Cuban intelligence, among other unsavory topics. The articles,
said McNeil, provoked an "intelligence and policy review at the State Department." Participating
in the review was Nestor Sanchez. [Sanchez is a former CIA division chief for Latin America at
the Directorate for Operations, and Deputy Asst. Secretary of Defense for Inter-American Affairs.
He resigned from the Defense Department post on Jan. 31, 1987. Sanchez's successor at the CIA
was Duane Clarridge.] At the first State Department policy review meeting, said McNeil, "the
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argument was put forth that Noriega should go, and the meeting ended inconclusively." At a
second meeting several days later, McNeil said participants complained of knowing little about the
inner workings of the Panamanian Defense Forces and the character and activities of its officers.
He concluded by saying, "To my knowledge, nothing was ever done...The statement was made
that...Noriega should be put on the shelf until Nicaragua was taken care of." McNeil continued
by mentioning that during early summer 1986, the Pia Vesta affair occurred, at which time "[Lt.
Col. Oliver] North approached Noriega to see if those arms could...be provided in some way to
support the contra operation. "Soon thereafter, Noriega offers Col. North sabotage missions inside
Nicaragua...Noriega was fond of promising a lot of help and not giving it. My own suspicion is if
he made that offer to Colonel North, he also told the Cubans that he was making the offer, and
that he had no intention of complying with it." McNeil added that such behavior fit with Noreiga's
"track record." CIA support for Noriega: McNeil testified that Noriega met with CIA Director
William Casey in Washington on Nov. 1, 1985. A memo summarizing this meeting received by the
State Department, said McNeil, indicated that Casey raised the issue of the use of Panamanian
firms circumventing the economic embargo against Cuba. The memo indicated that Casey had
not raised the narcotics issue, nor US concern about democratization in Panama. "Casey saw in
[Noriega] a valuable support for our policy in Central America, and particularly Nicaragua." McNeil
pointed out at this juncture the apparent contradiction in US policy. At the time, he said, the US
government's "stated policy" was support for democratization and a global effort to crack down on
international drug trafficking. Thus, the "US must not get too close to Noriega...Meanwhile, Noriega
[was] getting signals from Casey and the Defense Department that he need not pay attention" to
official US policy. US officials, said McNeil, were "led...to look the other way" in the case of Noriega,
result of the general's "alleged value to the US" in supporting the Nicaraguan contras. According
to McNeil, "Noriega's worth to the contra program was vastly oversold." The case of Honduran
General Jose Bueso Rosa [Background: Bueso Rosa, who was head of the Honduran army before a
military shake-up in March 1984, was considered a firm supporter of the US and reportedly gave
valuable assistance to administration efforts to aid the contras. Apparently angered by his demotion,
and subsequent removal from Honduras as military attache in Chile, the general participated in the
plot to assassinate Honduran President Roberto Suazo Cordova. (Suazo was president from 1981
to 1985.) Gen. Bueso Rosa pleaded guilty in June 1986 to two counts of traveling in furtherance of a
conspiracy to plan an assassination and is now serving five years in a minimum-security prison at
Eglin Air Force Base in Florida. One of those convicted in the plot was Gerard Latchinian, former
business partner of Felix Rodriguez, also known as Max Gomez. He was sentenced to 30 years on
charges of murder-for-hire and cocaine smuggling.] According to McNeil, in July 1984 two highranking US military officers informed the FBI that Gen. Bueso Rosa and two Honduran merchants
were seeking to hire a US mercenary to assassinate President Suazo. The FBI initiated a meticulous
investigation which culminated on Nov. 20, 1984, with the arrests of the merchants and accomplices
in Florida. When arrested, they were carrying $40 million worth of cocaine, to be used in financing
the assassination operation. An arrest warrant was issued for Gen. Bueso Rosa, then serving as
military attache for Honduras in Chile. Later, said McNeil, Gen. Bueso Rosa agrees to return from
Chile to face RICO murder-for-hire charges in the assassination plot. In mid-1986, arrangements
begin for the general's trial, and the plea bargaining is consummated. The two merchants are
sentenced to long prison terms on charges of murder-for-hire and cocaine smuggling. In August
1986, defense attorney Mark Richards, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, meets in Washington
with a US military officer and "the desk officer from Honduras." McNeil says, "The colonel asserts
a US intelligence interest in seeing the charges against Bueso Rosa dropped. Next, the colonel states
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the general has a future in Honduras..." [McNeil refers here and subsequently to testimony by Mark
Richards in closed session with the joint congressional select committee on the Iran-contra affair.
Richards' testimony has only recently been declassified.] According to McNeil, officials and legal
advisers at the State and Justice Departments, and Mark Richards decide the plea for leniency is
"nonsense...Bueso Rosa deserved no special consideration." McNeil added that the general's "future
in Honduras" could only be realized via a coup. McNeil then related an incident demonstrating the
level of support Bueso Rosa enjoyed at the Pentagon. He said he was contacted after the general had
been indicted by William Walker, deputy for Central American affairs at the State Department's
Inter-American Bureau. Walker asked McNeil who acted as State Department liaison with other
intelligence units if he could "do something" to cancel a luncheon honoring Gen. Bueso Rosa at
the Pentagon's executive dining room. The luncheon was organized by the Defense intelligence
agency. McNeil said he contacted an admiral at the Pentagon who admitted that the luncheon was a
bit "irregular," and that he understood the affair had been Nestor Sanchez's idea. As a result of the
State Department's concern over the impropriety of said luncheon, McNeil said, a meeting occurred
in State's conference room, described as a "cast of thousands" in Richards' testimony. "The meeting
was attended by at least six senior officials" and numerous other officials from State, CIA, Pentagon,
Justice, "and perhaps someone from the National Security Council...The lunch, we believe, was
canceled. But it took about an hour and a quarter of discussion about something that should have
been handled on the telephone." McNeil continued by pointing out that "at the sentencing of Col.
Bueso Rosa," two high-ranking US military officers testified as character witnesses. "Subsequently,
[Lt. Col. Oliver] North...enters the scene, and no less than eight senior US officials get involved in
the effort to see the charges dropped." McNeil mentions Adm. John Poindexter (North's superior,
former national security adviser), whose notes said that President Reagan "would like something to
be done for [Bueso Rosa]"; Dewey (Duane) Clarridge, then CIA division chief for Latin America at
the Directorate for Operations; Ret. Army Lt. Gen. Robert Schweitzer and Gen. Paul Gorman; Fred
Ikle, then Deputy Secretary of Defense; and Nestor Sanchez. According to McNeil, several Justice
and State Department officials were approached by North or Poindexter urging leniency for Bueso
Rosa. [At this juncture in the proceedings, Chairman Kerry intervenes with the following comments:
The effort to obtain leniency for Bueso Rosa, "as Mark Richards says, is always described in terms
of `he's a friend of the United States.' There's no specific reason for getting him off...It seems to me
that the circumstantial evidence is such that one has to wonder if there's not a narcotics angle. It
begins with the case itself, obviously. It adds Lt. Col. North's notes, which say that he is concerned
about narcotics involvement of the so-called `arms supermarket' in Honduras, and it extends, of
course, to the involvement of certain Honduran officers." Kerry mentions Col. Said Spear, former
military attache at the Honduran embassy in Colombia, suspected of "linkages" with the Medellin
cartel. Kerry continues: "Colonel North is quoted as saying in his note to Poindexter [on leniency
for the general]... that...Bueso Rosa could `sing songs we don't want to hear'. And my question, of
course, is what were those songs? Were they about narcotics, or possibly something else? [W]hat
was so embarrassing that...eight senior officers of the United States government would think it
necessary to get this man off?"] Next, McNeil said that the State Department's position on leniency
for Bueso Rosa was changed from rejection to support, largely as a result of Abrams' efforts. Several
State Department officials, said McNeil, demanded that no special consideration be accorded to
the general, and that he be sent to prison. The witness claimed his support for trying to stop the
"rather bizarre scheme" of offering leniency to Bueso Rosa led to warnings that he was "looking
for trouble" from one Jim Michael, an Abrams "deputy." McNeil continued by mentioning Mark
Richards' testimony: "He says that Elliott Abrams reversed the State Department position, which
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was...against giving any consideration to this man, who'd been convicted on two counts of RICO
conspiracy..." On drug & arms trafficking actors, sources & destinations McNeil said at that during
the period he served as ambassador to Costa Rica, he was aware of a "network" run by Cubans that
supplied arms from Panama through Costa Rica and Nicaragua to the Salvadoran rebels (FMLN).
Evidence of these connections was seen when a pilot flying a Panamanian Defense Forces plane,
Cesar Rodriguez, crashed in El Salvador. Some of the airstrips pertaining to this network, said
McNeil, were located in Costa Rica and Nicaragua. McNeil said he learned of the operations of
said network via US intelligence and "our own devices." The latter referred to embassy reports
prepared on the basis of "people who talked too much" of the network which was managed by the
Cuban consulate in San Jose at the time. Further evidence, said McNeil, came from Costa Rican
pilots involved in the network, including one Werner Lutz who is currently serving time in a US
prison. According to McNeil, the Panama-Costa Rica-Nicaragua- El Salvador network was probably
not as important as the links between the M-19 guerrillas in Colombia and the Medellin cartel.
"[B]ut even in 1980-81, Cuban involvement was clear." Next, McNeil stated that Washington was
aware of the "network" and its operations at the time he served as ambassador in Costa Rica. He
said he requested that the Carter administration see that necessary actions be taken at the Cuban
consulate, and in the Costa Rican government. McNeil said Costa Rican President Rodrigo Carazo
(1978-1982) was informed by US officials that Security Minister Juan Jose (sometimes known as "Don
Johnny") Echeverria was involved in smuggling arms to El Salvador. Shortly thereafter, Echeverria
resigned for what were stated as personal reasons. [After his resignation, on Oct. 30, 1980, Echeverria
testified in Costa Rica before a special legislative commission on arms trafficking. He reportedly
admitted that the Costa Rican government aided the Nicaraguan Sandinistas during the war with
the Somoza government, and that he personally made the decision. Echeverria had earlier denied
involvement in such aid. He said that he later notified President Carazo, who expressed neither
approval nor rejection of the decision. Echeverria denied arms trafficking to El Salvador, and that
arms had originated in Cuba. He confirmed that arms imported from Venezuela and Panama were
often stored on private property. The former minister also discussed the issue of the presence of US
helicopters in Guanacaste province during the final days of the Nicaraguan civil war, the purpose
of which, he said, was to rescue Somoza. Next, Echeverria stated that on Dec. 27, 1978, the Somoza
government had threatened to invade Costa Rica. He said he spoke with the US Ambassador about
the threat, and that on the same evening he was informed that "the US intervened, and we were not
invaded."] McNeil continued by stating that he understood Echeverria continued "his relationship
with Gen. Noriega" after his tenure as security minister. He said, "Echeverria acted as what he
himself described to Costa Ricans...as a business agent for Cuba and he travelled widely on all sorts
of deals. He certainly maintained a relationship with General Noriega as he did with the Cubans
and the Salvadoran insurgency and of course the government of Nicaragua." McNeil continued by
reiterating that the "network" which began as an effort to assist the Sandinista insurgents to oust
Somoza was continued after the 1979 revolution. This network the "same people, pilots, planes,
airstrips, etc." was then used to support the Salvadoran rebels. When asked by Kerry what he knew
about John Hull (a US citizen who owned a large ranch in northern Costa Rica), McNeil said he
met Hull in 1981, after receiving a request by the Costa Rican Minister of Planning to accompany
him to Hull's farm. At the time, said McNeil, the US was considering the expansion of development
programs in Costa Rica. When asked if he knew of Hull's "relationship" with McNeil's station chief,
McNeil said: "I know that John Hull has said he had a relationship with...the CIA, and I have no
reason to doubt that. And I recall mentioning to my station chief shortly before I left Costa Rica that
I thought they ought to be careful...I thought Mr. Hull talked a lot...The trip with him was to look at
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orange groves...drainage ditches...[I]t was a very prosaic trip." McNeil was asked to elaborate on the
drug component of the "triangular trade" (guns, money, drugs). He replied: "[Drugs] make enough
money...that it's very useful to finance revolutions of any ideological stripe...[P]robably in those
days there was a certain amount of free-lancing going on: you've got an empty plane going one way,
so you might as well carry something on it, something that may well have been repeated later."
McNeil added that the leftists were most certainly involved in such activity, and then suggested
that later, so were the Nicaraguan contras. McNeil said that to his knowledge, the contras were not
involved in drugs "early on," i.e., 1981. Later, after the cutoff of US congressional aid to the contras
and the creation of the private supply network, McNeil said that "clearly" some planes carrying
contra supplies also carried drugs. McNeil said he was "aware" during his time in Costa Rica and
after, of the presence of Colombian M-19 guerrillas in Nicaragua. In at least one case, he said, the
M-19 either received weapons from the Sandinistas, or from "Costa Ricans who kept a share of the
weapons." (Basic data and transcripts provided by National Security Archive, Washington, DC)

-- End --
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